






0. Introduction. My use of the phrase “evidence for use” originates in Nancy Cartwright’s 2006 paper, “Well‐Ordered Science: Evidence for Use.” There she states that her goal    is to urge us [philosophers of science] to direct our efforts away from the   more abstract questions that usually entertain us – from highly general   questions of warrant …to much more specific questions about particular   methods and their problems of implementation, their range of validity, their   strengths and weaknesses, and their costs and benefits” (2006, 982).    She goes on to suggest that one way to do this is to pay more attention to how claims are used instead of focusing only on how they are tested.     This idea might be useful in looking at debates in political science about the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative methods, which center in part on the fact that different methodologies might be appropriate depending on the goals of 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1 My statement of these theses interprets their views in a narrow sense.  It may be that DSI interprets the logic of justification more broadly than this statement implies, but I will work with this narrow interpretation as a way of more clearly identifying the possible points of disagreement and the ways in which the defenders of case study research have proceeded.  2 There are several features of DSI that make it difficult to sort out precisely what claims the authors are making. First, it is both a methodological tract and intended as a practical guide for researchers and the tone shifts back and forth from a more theoretical discussion to that of a handbook.  Second, though the authors claim that their goal is to connect the two traditions, it is clear that the way in which they are doing so is through reforming qualitative research to conform to their conception of scientific inference. In other words, it is not really through and integration of the two approaches.   However, throughout the book they also make comments about qualitative work being useful for hypothesis formation and the identification of variables.  These uses of qualitative research are not strictly speaking what the authors describe as part of the logic of inference, but rather might be characterized 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as the logic of discovery.  This is indeed how some of their critics do characterize their discussion.  3 I am thinking of Cartwright’s The Dappled World (1999) , but also more specifically 
Hunting Causes and Using Them (2007). 
 4 The name “reference class problem” is originally due to Reichenbach, but I have used Hájek’s account here because it seems to me particularly clear and Hájek also argues that the problem is not just a problem for frequentists but for all interpretations of probability. 
